TiLPS workshop on Faultless Disagreement and Truth Relativism

Are there topics on which people can disagree without fault? Many philosophers (e.g. Max Kölbel, John MacFarlane) have recently argued that faultless disagreement is a genuine phenomenon with important consequences for the correct semantics of, say, predicates of taste: a semantic account of predicates of taste would have to a judge-parameter relative to which the sentence in which the predicate occurs is evaluated. And if you accept that there is such a thing as faultless disagreement about tastes or epistemic entitlements, you may want to defend a form of assessment-relativism about truth. Others, however, reject that genuine faultless disagreement exists. They will hold on to an objective conception of truth and explain away the illusion of faultless disagreement via other means. At this TiLPS workshop, three speakers discuss the phenomenon and offer new perspectives:

Richard Dietz (Leuven University): Two Dogma’s About Correct Disagreement Sebastiano Moruzzi (University of Bologna) and Crispin Wright (St. Andrews): Trumping Assessment and the Aristotelian Future Filip Buekens: Faultless Disagreement and Expressivism

The workshop takes place at Tilburg University, Wednesday 24 september 2008 from 2 till 5 pm in room C186 (Ruth First Auditorium). The entrance is free, but please let us know if you’re planning to attend the workshop by sending an e-mail to [email protected].

For all the information about the workshop, please visit the workshop website: